

# Red Cell - Green Cell



## MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP)

U.S. Marine Corps

15 August 2023

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15 August 2023


FOREWORD

1. **PURPOSE.** MSTP designed Pamphlet 2-0.1, Red Cell - Green Cell to assist staff officers in establishing and employing a Red Cell and/or a Green Cell as part of the Marine Corps Planning Process.
2. **SCOPE.** This pamphlet addresses the Red Cell and Green Cell and discusses basic Red/Green cell concepts and the actions of these cells during problem framing, course of action development, course of action wargaming, and appropriate post-war game action. While the pamphlet primarily focuses at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, its information applies to all Marine Corps echelons of command.
3. **SUPERSESSION.** MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1, Red Cell - Green cell, published October 2011.
4. **CHANGES.** MSTP encourages recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet from commands and individuals. You can reproduce the attached User Suggestion Form and forward to:

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2301 Little Road  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

Recommendations may be sent electronically to: [MSTP\\_OPS@usmc.mil](mailto:MSTP_OPS@usmc.mil).

5. **CERTIFICATION.** Reviewed and approved this date.

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C. A. Browning  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Deputy Director  
MAGTF Staff Training Program Division  
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# Part I

## The Red Cell

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### 1001. Red Cell Fundamentals

The Red Cell, under the staff cognizance of the G-2, provides the OPT enemy Center of Gravity (COG) analysis, Most Likely and Most Dangerous Courses of Action (ML/MDCOA), and acts as the adversary in the COA wargame in order to assist the Operational Planning Team (OPT) in evaluating the friendly COAs. The Red Cell works under the supervision of the OPT's Intelligence Planner and is ultimately an extension of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) intelligence enterprise. By tasking the Red Cell with Enemy COG, ML/MDCOA, and replicating the adversary during the wargame, the Intelligence Planner can focus on issues such as Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) development, satisfying Requests for Information (RFI), identifying specified and implied intelligence tasks, collection planning, coordination with higher adjacent, and supporting organizations and the identification of resource shortfalls. While the OPT may decide not to establish a Red Cell in support of the planning process, the Red Cell functions identified above must be satisfied by the larger MAGTF intelligence enterprise.

#### a. What is a Red Cell?

The Red Cell is an intelligence-based organization established to provide analysis of the enemy in support of the Intelligence Planner and OPT. While the G-2 is responsible for providing the majority of the resourcing for the cell, it is imperative to include subject matter expertise from a variety of relevant domains and warfighting functions. As the Marine Corps shifts from a counterinsurgency to peer competitor focus, domains such as space and cyber and warfighting functions such as Information must be included in the Red Cell. The Red Cell must be established at the same time as the

OPT with sufficient capacity and expertise to support the OPT through all phases of the Marine Corps Design Methodology and Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPD). While the Red Cell is most visible during the COA wargame; it is most effective when it has been engaged from the outset of the planning process.

## **b. Purpose of the Red Cell**

*The purpose of the Red Cell is to assist the commander in assessing COAs against a thinking enemy. Depending on the size of the organization, a red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of subject matter experts (SMEs). While a red cell's principal duties center on COA development and the COA war game, it participates in the analysis of COGs and also supports the commander's understanding of the problem during the initial stages of design.*

*- MCWP 5-10*

The purpose of the Red Cell is to represent a thinking, doctrinally based enemy during all phases of the planning process. In coordination with the G-2, the Red Cell develops an enemy mission statement, commander's intent, the enemy main and supporting efforts, an intelligence collection plan, and executes enemy COAs during the war game. The Red Cell's thorough understanding of the enemy's doctrine, capabilities, and intent only develops through close interaction with the G2/S-2 assessment of the enemy. This dialogue ensures the OPT realistically considers the enemy's capabilities, limitations, and intentions when evaluating friendly COA(s). When properly resourced and employed, the Red Cell will help the commander and staff visualize enemy reactions and second and third order effects to friendly actions on the battlefield. The objective of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly COA(s) during the war game but to assist in testing, improving, modifying, and gaining a greater understanding of friendly COA(s).

**1002. Staff Cognizance of the Red Cell.** The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, states the Red Cell operates under the staff cognizance of the G-2. The G-2 is responsible for establishment of the Red Cell in support of the OPT. Ideally, the Red Cell is established simultaneously with the OPT. Daily, the Red Cell takes its guidance from the intelligence planner. It is critical for the G-2 to maintain continuous communication and support to the Red Cell. The G-2s intelligence capacity and expertise are critical enablers of the Red Cell, and the Red Cell products described in previous paragraphs should be developed in coordination with the G-2 staff. Ultimately, the G-2 is responsible for assessing the enemy and operating environment. If a disagreement arises among the Red Cell, Intelligence Planner, and G-2 staff concerning the enemy, the AC/S G-2 is responsible for adjudicating and resolving that disagreement.

### **1003. Red Cell Membership**

The Red Cell is task organized based on the mission. Red Cell members should represent relevant domains and warfighting functions from an adversary perspective to accurately replicate the enemy's capabilities. For example, if the enemy is an armor heavy threat in a desert environment; it would be advantageous to employ Marines with armor expertise within the Red Cell. Conversely, if the situation requires deep air strikes through heavy air defenses; it would be advantageous to use WTI graduates and air defense planners. The Red Cell leader should be a subject matter expert on the threat, and the Red Cell organization should be structured to provide high levels of experience with knowledge of enemy capabilities and tactics. That enemy expertise should be balanced against the perspectives of Marine aviation, Fires, Maneuver, Space, and Cyber experts serving on the OPT part time.

Further desirable skills and or experience for Red Cell members in traditional major combat operations could include engineering;

command and control; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Individuals who have been commanders, served on higher level staffs, or are weapons and tactics instructors can provide useful insights into Red Cell analysis during the COA war game.

In situations where a heavy civilian populace factor arises, such as counter insurgency or stability operations, other Red Cell relationships should include subject matter experts such as Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and civil agencies, etc. Language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capabilities are especially helpful in enabling the Red Cell to think from the adversary's perspective. LREC capabilities can help the Red Cell develop an in-depth, holistic understanding of the adversary's relationship to the neutral and friendly networks in the operating environment. Integrating LREC capabilities as early as possible will accelerate the Red Cell's learning curve and enhance its effectiveness.

#### **1004. Red Cell Relationships**

The Red Cell is a subcomponent of the OPT and all members should be present and engaged throughout all phases of the planning process. As stated in paragraph 0102, the Red Cell bridges the G-2/S-2 enemy analysis and the OPT staff actions. The Red Cell needs to understand the MCPP and the outputs required of the Red Cell at the conclusion of each step. The OPT must keep the Red Cell informed about changes in planning guidance and criteria as well as the planning schedule. Any information that affects the OPT also affects the Red Cell.

Even though the Red Cell conducts its own independent analysis, that analysis is based on the same reporting evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 staff. Wide analytic divergence between the G-2 staff and the Red Cell should be the exception to the rule. Continuous dialog



between the Red Cell and G-2 staff should further minimize this divergence. In instances where the Red Cell and G-2 staff continue to experience significant analytic disagreement regarding the adversary, it is imperative that the AC/S G-2 arbitrate that disagreement as early as possible. The G-2 must approve any changes to the most likely or most dangerous enemy COA(s). This ensures the information the G-2 briefs to the OPT and the commander is consistent with what the Red Cell refines and prepares for the COA war game. Furthermore, the G-2 and the Red Cell must collaborate on collections and other intelligence efforts to provide the best possible information throughout the planning process.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) or Stability Operations environment, it is particularly important for the Red Cell to also coordinate and share information with the Green Cell. The Green Cell, described in Part II of this pamphlet, operates as part of an OPT to model the civil population just as the Red Cell models the adversary. Interaction between the adversary and the population will affect the operating environment, and the OPT should consider it throughout its planning.

***Bottom Line: To be effective, the OPT, G-2/S-2, Red Cell and (if required) Green Cell must exchange information and analysis continually throughout the planning process.***

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## Part II

### Example Red Cell Products

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The Red Cell will draft these products as though the enemy created them. They will duplicate equivalent US doctrinal products but will use the enemy “voice” to demonstrate the adversarial perspective.

**2001. Enemy Mission Statement.** “The Northern Operational Group (NOG) conducts defensive operations to inflict maximum casualties on adversary forces in order to force their withdrawal from Orangeland: thereby, allowing friendly forces to gain sovereignty of the offshore oilfields through a negotiated settlement. Be prepared to prevent adversary forces from threatening the homeland.”

**2002. Enemy Commander’s Intent.** “I want to force the enemy to withdraw their forces from Orangeland. Inflicting casualties on adversary forces is more important than holding terrain. I view the landing of an amphibious force as an excellent opportunity to inflict maximum casualties on adversary forces. I want to make the enemy pay in blood for every inch of Orangeland soil they occupy. The sooner we inflict these casualties the faster we will wear down the enemy's will to fight. I see us wearing down adversary forces in their rear areas and as they build their combat power in Red Land. We will accomplish this through unconventional means. Do not risk the destruction of your forces, pull back when necessary, but be prepared to defend in earnest in the vicinity of Gabes. Chemical weapons will not be used unless the enemy attempts to breach our border.”

#### **2003. Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis**

- **Orangeland Strategic Center of Gravity.** Orangeland's *de facto* one-man rule and lack of formal governmental structure has focused power in the hands of Field Marshal Chilmand

Sondo. There are no legal political parties. Opposition groups are for the most part in exile. The Army represents a latent political bloc inside the country, as does the religious and tribal order, and other tribal groups. Sondo has encouraged in-fighting among his potential political and military successors to reduce internal threats to his power.

- **Operational Center of Gravity.** The NOG is the operational center of gravity. It is composed of eight separate brigades and two artillery regiments. The NOG has the personal sponsorship of Sondo and recruits personnel from the remainder of the armed forces. As a result, the quality of personnel and equipment within this unit is without equal within the armed forces.
- **Tactical Center of Gravity.** The 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigades form the tactical center of gravity for the NOG. These are the best equipped (the only ones with T-72 tanks), most effectively led units within the NOG. In both exercises and in recent operations, the NOG used the armored striking power of these brigades as its counterattack/exploitation force.

*See MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.2 Intelligence Planner's Guide dated June 2020 (Appendix A) for additional information on COG analysis.*

- **MAGTF COG.** The NOG sees the MAGTF COG as its logistics lines of communications. The upcoming campaign will test their capability to move, stockpile, and distribute fuel and water in a desert environment with few improved roads. The NOG believes it has identified several chokepoints (supply, ammunition, fuel dumps) it can attack using irregulars, special operations forces, and surface-to-surface missiles. Successful attacks will disrupt MEF logistics,

impose an unanticipated operational pause, and limit the ability of MAGTF forces to move and attack.

**2004. Relative Combat Power Analysis.** Table 2-1 is a rough-cut methodology for Relative Combat Power Analysis (RCPA). See MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.2 Intelligence Planner’s Guide dated June 2020 (Appendix B) for a fuller explanation of RCPA and discussion of the TRADOC Correlation of Forces Tool. A copy of the tool is available as a supplement to this pamphlet and found on MSTP’s SharePoint site at the following address:  
<https://eis.usmc.mil/sites/mstp/Pubs/SitePages/Doctrine.aspx>

Friendly Forces				Enemy Forces			
Type Unit	Nos.	Value	Weight	Type Unit	Nos.	Value	Weight
Tank Bn.	2	10	20	Tank Bn.	10	4	40
Atk Helo Sqdn	6	9	54	Atk Helo Sqdn	2	6	12
Arty Bn	6	8	48	Arty Bn	10	6	60
MRL Bn	1	10	10	MRL Bn	3	6	18
FW Sqdn	12	10	120	FW Sqdn	2	5	10
EW Sqdn	2	7	14	EW Sqdn	2	3	6
R&S Assets	2	9	18	R&S Assets	1	4	4
<b>Total</b>			<b>284</b>	<b>Total</b>			<b>150</b>
<b>Notes:</b>							

Table 2-1: Example of relative combat power

## **2005. Most Likely Course of Action**

### **a. Phase I—Delay/Withdraw**

- The 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades will initially occupy prepared positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. Do not take Sfax—this could prevent smooth withdrawal should it become necessary. Once confronted with a major allied ground offensive, these two brigades will begin, during darkness, to displace by echelon south towards Gabes, making maximum use of minefields and other obstacles to slow the American advance. The 102nd Armored Brigade will conduct limited counterattacks to prevent penetration of our lines and to cover the withdrawal of our slower infantry. The 205th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will occupy positions vicinity Gafsa in order to provide early warning and to delay an envelopment by US forces. Priority of fires from the 401st Artillery Regiment will go to the 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Engineer Battalion will assist the 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades develop defensive positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. The Engineer Battalion then supports the 204th Mechanized Infantry as it builds the second echelon defenses vicinity Gabes.
- The 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade will continue to occupy Djerba Island. The 103rd Armored Brigade will be the NOG reserve. Second echelon brigades will continue to secure the coastal road (Route 1) for resupply of the NOG and will establish an in-depth defense from the Orangeland border to Gabes. Operational control of the forward brigades will be delegated to the 102nd Armored Brigade commander. The rear echelon brigades will be under the operational control of 201st Mechanized Infantry Brigade commander.

- Organic AAA and SA-7s, along with the NOG Air Defense Regiment, will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will remain in Orangeland and will only be used to defend the homeland. Naval forces will primarily lay mines and attempt to hinder any attempt by US forces to conduct an amphibious assault.

## **b. Phase II—Defense of Gabes**

- Taking advantage of the constrained terrain, minefields, and obstacles around Gabes, the 202nd, 203rd, and 205th Mechanized Infantry Brigades will occupy and defend the prepared positions at Gabes. The 102nd Armored Brigade will support the defense by sealing off and eliminating local penetrations. The 103rd Armored Brigade will act as reserve. Priority of fires from the 401st Artillery Regiment will go to the defending Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Should the second defensive belt be penetrated, all units are to fall back by echelon behind the third defensive belt at Medenine.
- Prior to occupation of the second defensive belt, the 204th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will displace south and assist in the establishment of the third defensive belt vicinity Medenine. The remainder of NOG forces will be under the operational control of the 201st Mechanized Infantry Brigade.
- Fixed wing aircraft and naval forces will have the same concept of operations as in Phase I.

## **2006. Most Dangerous Course of Action**

### **a. Defense of Gabes**

- Taking advantage of the recent operational pause to resupply and refit, the NOG will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to our border. This course of action takes advantage of more defensible terrain. Our analysis of the enemy indicates his objective is to defeat our forces and force us from Tunisia. This forces them to attack into our strength, attempt an envelopment of our western flank over long distances and very inhospitable terrain, or attempt an amphibious landing along our eastern flank. Any one or a combination of these actions are to our advantage and will either drive the enemy to fight through a successive layer of defenses or diminish his combat power by attempting to fix us near Gabes and then proceed with one or more envelopments.
- The NOG's first echelon maneuver forces, consisting of the 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigade and the 202nd, 203rd, and 205th Mechanized Brigades, will establish defensive positions north and west of Gabes. Their mission is to defeat US forces attacking south along Route 1 and its adjacent corridors and from the west along Route 15. These forces will execute localized counterattacks and exploitation, as opportunities for such are presented. The 401st Artillery Regiment is in general support of the first echelon. First echelon forces are under the tactical control of the 102nd Armor Brigade.
- The NOG's second echelon force, consisting of the 101st and 104th Armored Brigades, the 201st and 204th Mechanized brigades, and the 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade, will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to our border. The 402nd Artillery Brigade is in general support of the second

echelon. The 204th Mechanized Brigade is the NOG's operational reserve and is to be prepared to counterattack or reinforce penetrations of first echelon forces along either Route 1 or Route 15. The 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade is to pay particular attention to potential amphibious landing sites along Djerba Island and immediately attack to repel an enemy landing. Remaining second echelon forces, while remaining in defensive positions, will be prepared to counter any attempt to envelop our western flank; the 201st Mechanized Brigade will give particular emphasis to identifying likely routes for enemy armor/mechanized units to move through that restricted terrain and effecting those measures and plans to prevent a breakthrough to the coast if an envelopment is attempted. The 101st Armored Brigade will be prepared to reinforce the 201st Mechanized Brigade or counterattack any amphibious landing along the coast south of Djerba Island. The 302nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 105th and 106th Armored Brigades, and 206th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will stage along the border, with the mission of counterattacking any amphibious assault.

- Organic AAA, SA-7s, and the NOG Air Defense Regiment will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will be used for defense of the homeland. Rotary-wing aircraft will be used to combat US forces. Naval forces will continue mining and harassment operations against enemy shipping.

**2007. Synchronization Matrix.** A synchronization matrix indicates when critical functions occur over time and their relationship with other events. It is used during COA development and the COA war game and focuses capabilities and asset allocation in relation to the enemy (selected COA), time and space, and events (DP).



<b>Enemy Most Likely Course of Action</b>			
<b>Time/Event</b>		<b>Phase I (Sousse-Sfax)</b>	<b>Phase II (Sfax-Gabes)</b>
		Delay/Withdraw	Defend
	Deep	SCUD attacks at ports/airfields. Conduct rear area operations	Same with added emphasis on enemy's extended lines of communications
	Security	Covering force engages forward/delays/withdraws. Counter-reconnaissance actions. Operations security enforced. Rear area patrols	Reestablish security zone north of Gabes. Engage, disrupt, fallback.
<b>Enemy Action</b>			
	Close	Civilian shields and refugees to block roads. No decisive engagements. Priority withdrawal: artillery, mechanized, armor.	If second defensive belt is penetrated, fall back. Withdraw flank elements at Gafsa based on enemy maneuver.
<b>Maneuver</b>	Reserve	103rd Armored Brigade remains in position	Reposition in vicinity of Medenine.
	Mobility	Maintain lines of communication and facilitate rearward movement to Gabes and forward movement of supplies to Gabes.	Maintain lines of communication to border.
	Counter-mobility	Blow bridges, Hasty mine fields. Force refugee movement to block roads. Antitank ambushes.	Same.
	Rear area	Begin to establish third echelon positions in vicinity of Medenine. Active security operations.	Withdraw FARP at Gabes. Position rear elements in vicinity of Orangeland border.
<b>Intelligence</b>		Identify main efforts at corps, division, and regimental level. Support friendly rear area operations	Continue to identify main efforts. Watch for indications of amphibious assault.
<b>Fires</b>	Lethal	Focus on attriting enemy and slowing his forward movement.	Same.
	Non-Lethal	Attack tactical command and fire direction nets.	Same.
<b>Logistics</b>	Sustainment	Buildup supply points in the vicinity of Gabes.	Same.
	Transport	Emphasis on pushing supplies to Gabes and evacuating casualties.	Same.
<b>Information</b>	Propaganda	Enemy propaganda to de-legitimize MAGTF operations	Same.

Table 2-2: Example of synchronization matrix

## 2008. Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix

		<b>Red</b>	<b>Blue</b>
<b>MANEUVER</b>		Lead elements are in defensive positions and hold key terrain.	Superior tracked mobility assets.
	Deep Operations	Aviation forces not well trained; normally operate under ground-based control.	Capable of full spectrum operations throughout the AO.
	Security		
	Close Operations		
	Reserve		Small reserve
	Rear Operations		
	Mobility		
	Counter-mobility	Mine warfare, mobile coastal missile and cruise missile armed fast attack craft capable of threatening Blue littoral operations.	Limited obstacle and mine-clearing assets.
<b>INTELLIGENCE</b>			UAS and aerial recce.
	NAI		
	TAI		
<b>FIRES</b>	Lethal	Capable of accurately massing artillery fires in support of offensive and defensive operations.	Multiple Launch Rocket System
	Non-Lethal		Aerial electronic warfare assets. Dedicated USA PSYOP assets.
<b>LOGISTICS</b>	Sustainment	Extended supply lines vulnerable to air interdiction	
	Transport		
<b>COMMAND AND CONTROL</b>		Overall command and control at Brigade and higher level is poor	
<b>FORCE PROTECTION</b>	NBC	Capable of employing weapons of mass destruction.	
	Air Defense	Integrated Air Defense System unable to expand beyond border.	
<b>INFORMATION</b>	Propaganda	Message well-tuned to the population based on cultural similarity	

Table 2-3: Example of Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix

## 2009. Enemy Culture in the Cognitive Dimension

Theme	Research Question
Identity	What are the adversary's underlying values and aspirations?
	What are the values and goals that the adversary believes they are fighting to defend or to spread?
Worldview	How does the adversary interpret conflict in today's order, as a continuous struggle or as episodic, and why? What belief systems or ideology contribute to that view?
	How does the adversary view the U.S.'s role and actions in the international system?
Education & Socialization	What are the linkages between the adversary and other groups in the AO, such as businesses, religions, schools, the arts, media, families, clubs, organized crime, etc.?
Ways of Thinking/ Perceiving	What are the contradictions regarding the adversary's ideas and logic? How are the contradictions reconciled, and if so, how?
	What are the parameters for group membership with the adversary, and are they currently changing or static?
Narratives	What are the adversary's primary narratives used against the U.S. and USMC units and what goals do they seek to achieve (e.g. mobilization of a particular group) by generating these narratives?
	How are their narratives articulated and disseminated?
Acquiring & Processing Information	What are the sources of information (i.e. formal, informal, or both) used by the adversary to inform their world view and generate their narratives?
	How does the adversary process this information to arrive at their conclusions? How do they verify truthfulness?

Table 2-4: Example Questions for Culture in the Cognitive Dimension

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## Part III

# The Green Cell

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**3001. Introduction.** *What we need is cultural intelligence. What I need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that's so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?*

General Anthony Zinni

Capital "W" War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War

**3002. Green Cell Fundamentals.** The Green Cell assists the commander, staff, and the OPT in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors in the civil environment that may significantly impact friendly operations. Like the Red Cell, planners employ the Green Cell throughout the entire planning process. The Green Cell will focus on testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment and to mitigate potential negative effects. Planners should employ a Green Cell during the MCPP across the warfighting spectrum not solely for stability operations or a counterinsurgency environment. Planners will likely encounter civilians in every potential Marine Corps operation; therefore, planners can always consider the use of a Green Cell to support the MCPP appropriate.

**3003. Purpose of the Green Cell.** The Green Cell considers the population to promote a better understanding of the civil environment and the nature of the problem confronting the MAGTF. At a minimum, the Green Cell considers the independent will of the population. The Green Cell may also provide considerations for non

Department of Defense (DOD) entities such as international organizations (e.g. United Nations, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, etc.) or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Green Cell membership can range from an individual to a task-organized group of subject matter experts (SME) that may include liaisons from the local populace and non-DOD agencies.

#### **3004. Staff Cognizance and Leadership of the Green Cell**

The Green Cell functions within the OPT. However, whenever practicable, the Green Cell should form under staff cognizance of the senior civil affairs (CA) staff member (G-9) in the command. The nature of CA operations (CAO) covering sociological, economic, and political factors of each area of operation requires comprehensive research and breadth of information upon which to base plans. Green Cell preparation nests with the actions of the civil-military operations (CMO) planner and the responsibilities of the senior CA Marine as they conduct civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB). In addition, the Green Cell works closely with G-2 Plans and the Red Cell. The collective efforts of these planners will serve to paint a more complete, synthesized picture of the operating environment for the Commander, his staff, and the OPT. Regardless of where the Green Cell falls, it still requires effective advocacy for resourcing, staffing, and other issues. The Green Cell planner must understand the MCPP and champion the need to account for the perspectives of all external stakeholders during Problem Framing, COA Development, and the COA Wargame.

The cognizant staff officer in close coordination with the OPT leader directs establishment of the Green Cell and designates the Green Cell lead. The Green Cell lead directs and oversees the detailed work of the Green Cell, coordinates Green Cell efforts with other command and external planning organizations (G-2/S-2 section, Red Cell, higher and adjacent Green Cell equivalent organizations, etc.), and serves as the primary “voice” and “face” of the Green Cell to the

command and the OPT. A CA officer, foreign area officer (FAO), regional affairs officer (RAO), or expert in a CMO functional area relevant to the command's battlespace (such as public works or governance) should lead the Green Cell- but above all an experienced MAGTF professional who can synthesize, apply, and effectively articulate relevant Green Cell input to the command planning process should lead the Green Cell.

### **3005. The Green Cell and Other Planning Stakeholders**

The Green Cell lead sets the tone and establishes the coordinating relationships and division of labor between the Green Cell and other planning stakeholders. Similarly, Green Cell members establish professional relationships with their planning counterparts. The following provides an overview and considerations for the most common stakeholders the Green Cell interacts with during planning:

**a. Civil Affairs Officer/G-9.** Normally exercising staff cognizance over the Green Cell, the CA staff member/G-9 provides inputs to the planning process. As the senior CA professional in the command, the G-9 also serves as a sounding board to ensure the Green Cell understands and implements the commander's guidance ("top down planning") and integrates its efforts across the battlespace ("single battle" and "integrated planning"). Typically, the reserve component Civil Affairs Group (CAG) Commanding Officer serves as the G-9 and senior CA/CMO subject matter expert. In the event of no G-9 assigned, the MEF table of organization includes a CMO planner (Lieutenant Colonel or Major billet(s)) who can assume the staff cognizance role.

#### **b. Civil-Military Operations Working Group**

As "owners" of the civil preparation of the battlespace process (discussed in Section 2003), the CMO Working Group and Green Cell should stay in close, continuous coordination - and may physically collocate. The initial stages of civil preparation of the

battlespace require tight integration between designated Green Cell members and the CMO Working Group. The two groups will often share SMEs and “divide” the civil preparation of the battlespace labor. The Green Cell may also rely on CMO Working Group support to develop planning products. The group lead should make an early determination/agreement on the amount and type of support that the CMO Working Group can provide to the Green Cell (and vice versa). It is critical to ensure common understanding of the civil environment among members of both organizations throughout planning. The leaders of both organizations should discuss and identify disagreements on aspects of the environment to the G-9 and CA OPT representative for resolution.

**c. Civil Affairs Representative to the Operational Planning**

**Team.** The CA representative serves as the CMO SME to the OPT responsible to inform the Green Cell lead on all Green Cell activities, significant civil factors uncovered in the course of the cell’s work, and any other information that may help the CA representatives in their OPT responsibilities. These two individuals must clearly define division of labor and internal procedures for presenting the picture of the civil environment to the OPT. If not done properly, planning friction and confusion will likely result. As a general rule, the CA representative presents friendly (“blue”) aspects of CMO to the OPT that may include U.S. interagency/non-DOD entities, and the Green Cell presents other designated aspects of the civil environment to the OPT - but both representatives must agree on a shared understanding of the civil environment. The Green Cell should not “surprise” the CA representative during the planning process, and the Green Cell objective is not to “defeat” the friendly CA concept of support - the cell assists the CA representative in refining and improving CMO actions and the CMO Concept of Support. At lower echelons of command (e.g., Regiment, Battalion) the CA representative is likely the CMO planner.

**d. Intelligence Section and the Intelligence Representative to the Operational Planning Team.** The intelligence section develops and

presents the picture of the operational environment and the threat framing their work using the intelligence IPB process. Civil affairs and intelligence initially rely on many of the same databases and source information for the physical environment. It is crucial that these two staff sections coordinate. While the CMO Working Group conducts much of the CA coordination, the Green Cell takes part in this process whenever feasible to ensure the uniform portrayal of the “basics” of the physical and cultural environment (to include ethnic boundaries, etc.) to the command. Civil affairs and intelligence share information throughout the planning process whenever practicable. In some cases, the CMO Working Group may embed an intelligence analyst, or a cell within the intelligence section could provide “direct support” to civil information requirements. When the Green Cell needs specific intelligence, section support it coordinates with the CMO Working Group to avoid requesting / tasking conflicts with the intelligence section.

**e. Red Cell.** The Red Cell assists the commander and OPT by providing a better understanding of how the threat will attempt to achieve its objectives and in assessing, refining, and improving the plan with respect to the threat. Because the threat typically operates in the same civil environment as friendly forces, the Green Cell and Red Cell should discuss their analysis prior to COA war game - friendly and threat forces share similar objectives in regard to the civil environment (i.e., “influence the population”) but use different means to reach those objectives. During the COA war game, the Green Cell will provide reaction to both friendly and enemy actions - the Green Cell should maintain a solid understanding of how the Red Cell will portray the designated threat COA. Likewise, the Red Cell should gain some understanding of the “key influences” that the Green Cell will portray during COA war game.

**f. LREC Support to the Green Cell.** LREC capabilities can especially help enable the Green Cell or the CMO Working Group and CA staff to conduct CPB and to accurately portray the civilian



population's reactions during wargaming. LREC capabilities help the Green Cell develop an in-depth, holistic understanding of the civilian population's relationship to the threat and friendly networks in the operating environment. The LREC Capability Coordinator assists the Green Cell with identifying what LREC capabilities it requires, sourcing or developing those capabilities, and integrating them into the Green Cell's activities. Integrating LREC capabilities as early as possible will accelerate the Green Cell's learning curve and enhance its effectiveness.

**g. Operational Planning Team Leader.** As the commander's representative leading the planning process, the OPT leader directs the overall effort. The Green Cell OIC should maintain a positive working relationship with the OPT leader, keep him/her updated on Green Cell activities, and not deliberately "surprise" the OPT leader with aspects of the civil environment that will impact friendly planning. Key areas where the OPT leader can play some role / provide input include the designation of the Green Cell lead, determination of the "key influences" the Green Cell will portray, and the decision to "stand down" the Green Cell.

### **3006. Green Cell Composition**

Composition of the Green Cell reflects the most significant aspects of the civil environment the cell will represent. Ideally, the first two steps of the CPB process ("defining" and "analyzing" the operational environment) and the intelligence section's IPB process helps to identify these significant aspects. In practice, the Green Cell often forms while the IPB and CPB processes emerge in their early stages - this requires the CA staff, Green Cell lead, OPT lead, LREC Capability Coordinator, etc., to make their best professional assessment on Green Cell composition. LREC capabilities, ideally integrated as early as possible, provide valuable contributions to Green Cell activities and products. However, once the CPB process gets underway, the Green Cell lead must identify the "key

influences” the Green Cell will portray to refine cell composition, determine expertise shortfalls in the cell, and develop shortfall mitigation measures (such as SME reach back). If the Green Cell lead determines organic LREC capabilities appear insufficient, the LREC Capability Coordinator assists with mitigating shortfalls.

SME “near real time” or even “time delayed” reach back can provide a viable and valuable resource. The Green Cell lead should actively consider employing “virtual cell members” to access unique expertise not locally available. Other factors influencing cell composition include the security classification level of the planning evolution, “high demand-low density” SME availability (in some cases, the Green Cell may “share” a SME with another planning organization (intelligence section, Red Cell, combat engineer section, etc.), and in the case of non-DOD/U.S. interagency partners, the willingness of those organizations to participate in a U.S. military planning evolution - by the very nature of the civil environment the Green Cell will often require “non-traditional” cell membership - to include inter-organizational, coalition/host nation civil officials, cultural/academic SMEs, and in some cases members of the civil population in the battlespace - this “non-traditional” membership requires creative ways to physically integrate members into the cell and to integrate their intellectual input and products into the process.

Additionally, non-DOD personnel may only participate on a limited or part time basis. Despite these challenges, the Green Cell lead should make the necessary effort to integrate “nontraditional” member expertise and input because it often adds critical input to understanding the civil environment and the character of the population with whom we must interact.

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## Part IV

# The Green Cell and Execution Of the Planning Process

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**4001. Overview.** MAGTF OPTs use the MCPP as their framework for organizing and using a Green Cell. However, a planning group may use other service, joint, interagency, or even coalition planning models. In most cases, the processes appear similar to the MCPP and the considerations below still apply.

### **4002. Green Cell Resources**

Green cell members, particularly the Green Cell lead, should stay current with the contents of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*. In addition to this Pamphlet, other publications that will assist in the Green Cell activities include:

- MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations*
- Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03A, *MAGTF CMO*
- MCCMOS Circular 3.0, *MAGTF CMO*
- MCCMOS Circular 3.1, *GREEN CELL*
- *Operational Culture for the Warfighter 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*
- Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook*
- MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Leader's Guide*
- *Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-first Century Military*
- *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals*

These resources provide doctrinal framework, process descriptions, and valuable techniques and procedures the cell can use throughout the planning process.

### **4003. Civil Preparation of the Battlespace**

The Green Cell can use Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB) to examine civil considerations in support of problem framing and the overall IPB process. According to MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations*, forces conduct CPB through the framework of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and support available-time available) to focus on civil considerations as they relate to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. CPB analyzes the various aspects of civil information and assesses the potential impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors on the civil population as well as the civil population's potential impact on MAGTF operations and the achievement of MAGTF objectives. CPB evolved from previous techniques used to analyze, conceptualize, and model the civil environment to include the legacy Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace process. Civil preparation of the battlespace consists of a four-step iterative process designed to support MAGTF decision makers, staff, and the total force. The Green Cell builds the CPB to apply aspects of the civil environment within the MCPP while complementing IPB. The four steps of the civil preparation of the battlespace process include:

1. Define the Civil Operating Environment
2. Analyze the Civil Operating Environment
3. Develop a Civil Environment Model
4. Determine Civil Actions

The Green Cell continually refines each step in the process to ensure the accuracy of the CPB products and relevance to decision making. Green Cell team members should stay current with the CPB process as steps 3 (Develop a Civil Environment Model) and 4 (Determine

Civil Actions) form the basis of their support to COA war game in the MCPP. The following provides a brief overview of each step of CPB.

- **Step 1: Define the Civil Operating Environment**

This step focuses on collecting and categorizing civil information. This disciplined approach gathers and organizes civil information, categorizes, and records the results. The Green Cell should gather and organize information relevant to the assigned Area of Operation (AO) - the “what do I see?” approach to looking at the data. At a minimum, categorize the information using standard civil considerations (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events - ASCOPE) as the baseline. This product forms the basis of all further civil information collection and should result in an ASCOPE matrix.

- *Civil Considerations*

- Areas - where do people live, work, play? These include political boundaries, religious boundaries, social boundaries, criminal enclaves, agricultural regions, industrial centers, education centers, and/or trade routes as examples.
- Structures - why are structures important to the people? These include government structures, religious structures, medical structures, warehouses, bridges, markets / shopping structures, airports, and/or seaports.
- Capabilities - what capabilities exist in the AO? These include sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, security, and/or other capabilities.
- Organizations - what different groups populate the area? These include political factions, international

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, social groups, religious organizations, media groups, and/or criminal groups.

- People - how do people organize and interact? These include political leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, business leaders, community professionals, education professionals, law enforcement leaders, and/or military leaders.
- Events - when and what events are important to the people? These include holidays, carnivals, religious celebrations, weather events (e.g., monsoon), harvest periods, and/or migratory events (e.g., Hajj).
- *Operational Variables*. Further categorize ASCOPE utilizing operational variables (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure - PMESII).
  - The Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government to include political structure (both formal and informal).
  - The Military variable includes the military capabilities of armed forces (HN, local militia, and police).
  - The Economic variable consists of general economic categories of the AO (energy, raw materials, labor distribution, income/food distribution, goods/services, and illicit markets).
  - The Social variable describes societies within an operational environment (a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity).
  - The Information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance

on data, social/media, and knowledge systems (both civilian and military) by the local communities.

- The Infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a community or society to function.

Combining the two sets of information results in the ASCOPE-PMESII Matrix. ASCOPE – The PMESII matrix provides an organizational tool designed to categorize information about the civil aspects of the environment. Each of the 36 “boxes” depicted should include a supporting narrative, overlay, or amplifying data with appropriate analysis that informs the Green Cell and OPT. Each box requires more than a single bullet. See Appendix A, Figs. 1, 2, and 3 for examples.

- **Step 2: Analyze the Civil Operating Environment**

The focus of effort in this step analyzes the information collected during Step 1. Analysis takes into consideration several variables to include operational culture, stability and instability dynamics, and includes a study of geospatial and stakeholder factors. At its most basic level, the effort in Step 2 carefully examines civil considerations using operational variables (PMESII) to ascertain primary factors relevant to MAGTF operations and to aid in understanding the stability/instability dynamics of the civil analysis of the AO.

- *Operational Culture.* To better account for and anticipate civil impacts on MAGTF operations, CPB seeks to account for cultural considerations. LREC capabilities provide essential data to effective sociocultural analysis. The Green Cell leverages available LREC support to establish a baseline understanding of the human aspects of the civil operational environment. Although no

singular approach applies a cultural lens to the data collected in step 1, the Green Cell may use the operational culture framework, which consists of five (5) “dimensions” influencing operationally relevant behavior, conduct, and attitudes. These operational culture dimensions involve the *physical environment*, the *economy* of a culture, *social structures*, *political structures*, and the *beliefs* and symbols of a culture group. Another approach concerns the cognitive dimension framework that consists of identity, worldview, education and socialization, narratives, acquiring and processing information, and ways of thinking/perceiving. The Green Cell should choose the cultural framework that best supports sociocultural analysis and the commander’s decision-making process. Every situation will require careful consideration based on the commander’s intent and guidance and the nature of the MAGTF’s operations.

The Green Cell should endeavor to apply cultural perspective-taking (the process of recognizing and articulating how a situation could appear from someone else’s standpoint) and cultural interpretation (the process by which we derive understanding and meaning) to the information they gathered. This approach minimizes “mirror-imaging,” i.e. “...interpreting what you see through the lens of your own cultural background and experience... [which] can lead you to make inaccurate assumptions.”<sup>1</sup> When conducting sociocultural analysis on the information collected in Step 1, a sound approach considers the relevant questions posed in Appendix B of *Operational Culture for the Warfighter, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*. However, in the absence of culturally competent individuals available to support the analysis, the end product may provide no better awareness than the raw

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<sup>1</sup> *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals, 73.*



data presented. We still need LREC capabilities (e.g. cultural advisor, FAO) to interpret the data and provide appropriate context. Cultural self-awareness, perspective-taking, and sense making provide essential analysis to this process. Applying these concepts and skills to the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix creates a product where the whole provides greater value than the sum of its parts. See Appendix A, Fig. 4 for example operational culture matrix. LREC Analysis and LREC Assessment products also provide substantive inputs to this analysis.

- *Instability and Stability Dynamics.* Green Cell members endeavor to understand instability and stability dynamics. This includes understanding the potential sources of conflict or grievances (instability) as well as resiliencies (stability) of the local population, identifying key influences, and identifying events that could affect stability and instability.

*Key influences* – “selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure and socio-cultural belief sets or factors, which could have a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment and should be considered in operational planning and execution.” *DRAFT* Definition, MCCMOS

(Key influences are further discussed in Para 2003, Problem Framing)

Analysis of instability/stability factors occurs in an iterative nature inherent to the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) process. MCWP 3-03 *Stability Operations* and MCCMOS Circular 3.0 discuss SAF. Green Cell members do not need to complete the SAF process to understand instability and stability dynamics, but they should understand that SAF provides a number of tools to analyze instability/stability dynamics as well

as mitigation and enhancement activities to support overall stability.

Instability results when factors fostering instability (grievances) overwhelm societal resiliencies and/or the ability of the government to mitigate these factors. The Green Cell should consider the following to assist in assessing grievances within the AO:

- What factors decrease support for the government?
- What factors increase support for “malign actors?”
- What factors disrupt the normal functioning of society?

The Green Cell should consider the following to assist in assessing stability (resiliencies) within the AO:

- What factors increase support for the government?
- What factors decrease support for “malign actors?”
- What factors increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities?

Green Cell members work closely with the CMO Working Group to develop a baseline for accounting for instability and stability dynamics.

- *Stakeholder Analysis.* When analyzing stakeholders in the civil environment, no “hard and fast” methodology exists. New stakeholders may emerge with changes in the situation and the environment, stakeholders may change sides, and our friendly actions can result in negative and unintended effects on “friendly” stakeholders. Social Network Analysis (SNA) provides a helpful tool available to the Green Cell. The G-2, CA/G-9, and the Green Cell should collaborate in developing the SNA. When

considering the stability of a populace, closely assessing the appeal of individual leaders or the attraction of a particular group proves just as critical and often more informative than simply studying the underlying cause of conflict (e.g. – tribal or ethnic tension, competition for resources). SNA can help the Green Cell to appreciate the present and potential spheres of influence held by key groups and individuals. While SNA can show linkages, Green Cell also considers the following three characteristics: *power*, *legitimacy*, and *urgency* as they relate to the stakeholders. The greater the overlap of these three characteristics the greater the significance of that person or group. For example, a populace may view a local leader as legitimate. As long as he lacks a power base or a motive for change, he likely remains very inactive or lacks influence. We can think of urgency as both time-sensitive and of critical interest for the individual or group it affects. Because urgency exists a matter of time, considering this characteristic provides the Green Cell insight into the dynamics of potential actions.

- **Step 3: Develop a Civil Environment Model**

A Civil Environment Model depicts a system of key influences. The purpose provides a model of civilian life and activities to serve as a baseline for MAGTF planning. Step 3 of CPB provides an evaluation and interpretation of information about key influences to discern catalysts of behavior and the context that shapes behavior. The civil environment model informs the commander's understanding of key influences by detailing societies, populations, and other groups of people including their activities, relationships, and perspectives. Modelling the civil environment may include the graphic representation of social and cultural information for a given area presented spatially

(on a map) and temporally (as a snapshot in time) as depicted in Figure 10 in Appendix A. The model also describes the environment and civil/social norms in narrative form. The exact content of the narrative derives from previous analysis, but it should consist of all relevant civil factors such as relationships and activities of the population, social network analysis (looking at the interpersonal, professional, and social networks tied to key influences), as well as small and large group dynamics, physical environment factors, etc.

- **Step 4: Determine Civil Actions**

The focus of this step utilizes the information and analysis from previous steps to determine potential civil actions with respect to MAGTF operations within the AO. By civil actions we mean modeling the independent will of the population and key influences relating to friendly and malign actions within the AO. Green Cell members and CMO planners develop an initial assessment of possible civil actions in a particular area within the MAGTF battlespace. The Green Cell further refines this assessment and uses it during the COA War Game. The civil actions help to paint a more complete picture of the operating environment focused on indigenous people and their leadership. They also consider any international organizations and NGOs or other stakeholders in the area of operation (battlespace, village, district, and province). The LREC Assessment product provides useful input to this step. By the time the OPT gets to COA war game, the Green Cell describes and projects how the friendly COA(s) and the civil environment will affect one another.

Like civil preparation of the battlespace, the concept of the Green Cell evolved from previous models into a more structured and defined tool for use by the commander and staff. The Green Cell works in conjunction with the CMO

Working Group and in coordination with the intelligence section in the CPB / IPB processes. During the early stages of problem framing the Green Cell coordinates with the CMO Working Group to provide the OPT with a civil environment orientation (similar to the intelligence section threat orientation) based on the civil preparation of the battlespace effort up to that point. Joint planning would include this orientation as a part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment.

#### **4004. Problem Framing**

The OPT strives to understand the environment and to understand the problem confronting the MAGTF during Problem Framing. The Green Cell works closely with the CMO Working Group to play a critical role by helping the Commander and the OPT consider the civil aspects of the environment and how they feed into understanding the nature of the problem. The Green Cell pursues the dual focus of both gaining and developing its own situational awareness as well as working closely with the CMO Working Group during Problem Framing to ensure the OPT integrates civil and cultural considerations into its understanding of the operating environment.

It accomplishes this through close coordination with its primary sources of information, such as: the intelligence section and their products; civil-military operations databases; CA representatives, Department of State and/or United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives, academia, a Political Advisor (POLAD) and/or Cultural Advisor (CULAD). Additionally, the Green Cell participates in the design dialog and continues to contribute to the IPB and all other OPT briefings.

A critical function of the Green Cell during problem framing concerns the development and approval of the Civil Environment Model concept. As early as possible in this step, the Green Cell lead

briefs the staff cognizant officer and the OPT leader / selected OPT members on the key influences the cell intends to portray in the planning process. The key influences the cell portrays determine the direction and scope of Green Cell activities for the remainder of the process and drives the commander, staff, and OPT understanding of the civil environment and its effects on friendly planning/operations.

- **Key Influences.** We can determine key influences – those people, places, and things that could exert a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment by asking the following questions:
  - What are the sources and nature of the key influences that can affect friendly force operations?
  - By what manner/means can the key influences apply its influence on friendly operations?
  - How quickly can the key influences impact be applied to affect friendly operations?
  - What is the magnitude (width, depth, number of people/groups, how much, how far) of the key influence’s effect?

If answers to the above questions indicate the key influence could significantly impact friendly operations, then the Civil Environment Model should include that influence.

The Green Cell determines key influence *motivations and goals*. For individuals and groups this may prove difficult to determine. An analytical “best guess” may suffice until the Green Cell can further develop the target. Motivations and goals may shift in a dynamic environment, - a key influence may pursue both short and long-term goals. Distinguishing between the two sets may become important in determining how the key influence might enhance or degrade friendly operations. For intangible factors (for example, a rising river), inherent motivations and goals may not surface. However, rising rivers could leverage as much of an effect on behaviors and

other aspects of the environment as policy changes, violence, or charismatic leaders. Therefore, in this example understanding the motivations and goals of the individuals and groups' as they relate to the rising river may become a valuable tool.

Techniques the Green Cell can use to determine motivations and goals include:

- Identify relationships/dynamics between key influence and the environment (people, places, things).
- Identify key influence conflicts and their sources to include grievances, ethnic/ religious tension, competition for natural resources, etc.
- Identify sources of resiliency - what structures, assets, means, etc., sustain the key influence and are used to retain position/power/legitimacy.
- Determine key influence desired end states - friendly, rival/threat, environment. Look at both short and longer-term goals.

The Green Cell determines key influence's *Abilities, Capabilities, and Means*. The Green Cell uses pertinent information to identify key influence and provides a description of preferred actions and options. Determining "means" includes identifying tangible assets (people, places, things) that the key influence can employ as well as intangible assets that give the key influence "means" – e.g., religious legitimacy. The sources of resiliency and relationships dynamics between key influences identified above translate into critical "means" in this step.

An evaluation of key influence's *potential impact on friendly operations / objectives* should commence. An assessment of key influence potential courses of action includes: Why, how, what, when, and where the key influence can degrade or enhance friendly operations and to what extent. This information helps to develop

specific actions/tasks during COA Development of MCPP to either mitigate or take advantage of key influence effects on friendly operations and the Civil Environment.

Other Green Cell activities during this step include cell members gaining situational awareness, providing civil environment input to the commander / OPT “design dialogue,” and ensuring the application of aspects of the Civil Environment Model to COG analysis, suggested commander’s intent, proposed commander’s critical information requirements, assumptions, task analysis, and the other staff actions performed during the problem framing step.

The Green Cell also coordinates with the CMO Working Group to provide relevant input for the OPT problem framing brief, which at a minimum should include a summary of significant aspects of the civil environment (individuals, groups, infrastructure, and belief sets/intangibles) as well as associated potential friendly planning considerations.

#### **4005. Course of Action Development**

During this step, the OPT develops one or more options for how to accomplish the mission and commander’s intent. As options develop, the Green Cell, in coordination with the CMO OPT representative and/or CMO Working Group ensures the OPT considers the civil environment - the cell assesses how friendly actions might affect the civil environment, provides the OPT with feedback on these effects, and suggests possible enhancement or mitigation measures to build into COAs. In addition, the Green Cell begins COA war game preparation and continues to refine the Civil Environment Model.

The Green Cell began looking at the civil components of the operating environment, identifying key influences, and mapping the dynamic nature of interrelated effects during Problem Framing. The



Green Cell can use the Civil Environment Model to provide specific recommendations to COA development. Examples include:

- **Identification of key influence.** Key influence (individuals, groups, tangible assets and societal-cultural factors) become potential engagement targets for friendly leadership, units, and organizations. In particular, the command effects and assessment cells may identify key influences for further information collection and nonlethal shaping. Key influence engagements will often translate into COA tasks for subordinate elements. Appendix A provides an example for determining key influences and “mapping” them to prioritize for engagement.
- **Identification of grievances.** By identifying grievances of specific groups or influential leaders the OPT can generate tasks to subordinate elements along with intermediate objectives that address grievances that require mitigation for friendly success. Likewise, the OPT can use grievances associated with threat actions to friendly advantage in a COA.
- **Identification of “windows of opportunity” and “windows of vulnerability.”** Key events (holidays, elections, etc.) may create opportunity or vulnerability for friendly force COAs and influence the timing, scope, and location of friendly actions. Likewise, civil events may provide windows of opportunity or vulnerability for threat forces.

In addition to aiding friendly COA development the Green Cell supports the CMO Working Group and CMO OPT representative in developing the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix, the CMO staff estimate / supporting concepts, and in providing CMO input to the OPT course of action brief. Lastly, via the CMO OPT representative, the Green Cell provides input from the civil environment perspective to assist the commander in developing COA War Game guidance and evaluation criteria. The OPT may receive

COA War Game guidance and evaluation criteria at the conclusion of the COA development step.

#### **4006. Course of Action War Game**

The OPT uses the COA War Game to improve the plan by examining and refining options (COA) in relation to adversary capabilities and actions as well as in relation to the physical and civil environments. In this step, the Green Cell “brings the civil environment to life” in the form of key influence wargame actions that describe how friendly COA(s), threat actions, and the civil environment will affect one another.

The importance of a well-developed Civil Environment Model and the proper selection of key influences will become readily apparent during the COA War Game. If the model lacks sufficient detail and/or if the Green Cell selected too many, too few, or the “wrong” key influences, then the ability of the Green Cell to assist the OPT in assessing, refining, and modifying friendly COA(s) degrades.

COA War Game can take many forms from a quick tabletop discussion at the small unit level to a complex multi-day event at higher echelons. In most cases, a normal wargame “turn” consists of a friendly action portion (friendly force representatives’ brief actions along warfighting function or lines of operation (LOO) followed by a threat reaction portion (Red Cell briefs reactions in response to friendly actions).

Following the Red Cell reaction the Green Cell should brief civil environment reactions (most likely or most disruptive civil action per commander’s guidance) by key influences - a significant point suggests that civil environment reactions respond to both the friendly action AND the threat reaction within that turn. A “counteraction” portion follows the “reaction” portion of the turn - based on the outcome of “action / reaction.” The OPT can modify the friendly

initial action based on the results of the turn. Note that this modification should provide an improvement / enhancement to the initial friendly COA action and not an additional friendly “turn” within the wargame turn.

In addition, while the Red Cell may create its own undesired effects in the civil environment due to its “reaction” during that turn, the Red Cell will not normally modify (counteract) the threat COA. The OPT can discuss modifying the threat COA, but the COA War Game focuses on friendly COA “improvement” not the threat COA.

From a civil environment perspective, the Green Cell helps improve the friendly COA by realistic and well-developed Green Cell reactions portraying key influences and by providing feedback to the OPT on opportunities / risks in the friendly COA and identification of 2nd and 3rd order effects of friendly actions that may impact the mission. LREC capabilities can especially help enabling the Green Cell to accurately portray the civilian population’s reactions.

The Green Cell continues to work with the CMO Working Group and CMO OPT representative in developing the CMO staff estimate, supporting concept, etc. The cell also provides relevant input to the CMO OPT representative for the COA wargame brief with emphasis on advantages / disadvantages of COAs from a civil environment perspective.

**4007. Course of Action Comparison and Decision.** The Green Cell provides input to this process by explaining how the war gamed COA(s) affects the civil environment and key influences. It can also provide feedback/analysis concerning the most and least effective COAs in achieving friendly objectives / end states in the civil environment. Once a COA is approved, the cell supports the CMO Working Group and CMO OPT representative in refining the staff estimate / CMO Concept of Support, providing input to any warning

order updates and the development of any branch (or sequel) planning directed by the commander.

**4008. Orders Development.** The purpose of this step translates the commander's COA decision into communications media (e.g., written, oral, graphic, etc.) sufficient to guide implementation of the plan (COA) and to promote initiative by subordinates executing the plan. The Green Cell could stand down during this step. The staff cognizant officer and OPT leader make this mutual decision. A recommended technique suggests the Green Cell lead remains with the CMO section to support orders development and serve as a resource to other staff sections as they develop their portion of the orders. The cell OIC should maintain communication with former cell members to clarify / answer requirements in their specific areas of expertise.

**4009. Transition.** This step includes a wide range of activities conducted to ensure a successful shift by the force from "planning" to "execution" of the plan. From the CMO perspective, this often involves transitioning planning products and orders to CA tactical asset leaders and their personnel. Similar to the orders development step, the Green Cell OIC participation during transition can greatly facilitate translating the products and rationale of planning to the assets that will execute the CMO Concept of Support.

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## **Part V**

### **Example Green Cell Products**

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**5001. Overview.** The following examples represent potential Green Cell products used to support the MCPP. All of these products apply to the civil preparation of the battlespace process. Civil affairs Marines, civil-military operations planners, and the MAGTF intelligence section use many of these products in the production of their staff estimates and to develop their respective annexes to the MAGTF base order. LREC capabilities assist in developing a deeper understanding of the civilian population more quickly, which can enhance the accuracy and depth of detail of the Green Cell's products. LREC Analysis and LREC Assessment products may also provide useful inputs to Green Cell product development.

#### **5002. ASCOPE-PMESII**

- Figure 5-1 represents the basic ASCOPE-PMESII matrix. Each of the 36 blocks within the matrix should include a short description. However, the matrix design cannot limit itself to one page. Rather, the matrix provides a template to organize and collate civil information and may, for example, appear in the form of an Excel Workbook with 36 tabs. Similarly, the ASCOPE-PMESII may take the form of a Word document, etc.

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & national ties)	Capabilities - Info (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)
O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / IOs)	Organizations - Information (NEWS groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders from coalition, LN and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bankers, landholders, merchants)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families)	People - Information (Media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure Builders, contractors, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Info (Information Ops campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

Figure 5-1: ASCOPE-PMESII Matrix

- Figure 5-2 represents a graphic portrayal of civil “structures” (6 “boxes”). Again, many ways of highlighting the important civil structures exist. This example includes a callout for each operational variable.

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dunes)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities -	Capabilities -	Capabilities -	Capabilities - Info	Capabilities -
Orga nizations	Orga nizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers)					Orga nizations -
People	People councils, etc.					People -
Events	Events (elections, court meetings)	Events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	business open/close)	weddings, religious days)	campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road /bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

Figure 5-2: ASCOPE-PMESII Graphic – “Structures”

- As described earlier, each of the 36 “boxes” should include a supporting narrative, overlay, or amplifying data with appropriate analysis that informs and becomes meaningful to the Green Cell and OPT. The example below, Figure 5-3, illustrates 1 “box” - the civil consideration “structures” and the operational variable “political.”



	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure	
<b>A</b> Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)	
<b>S</b> Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)			Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)	
<b>C</b> Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strength and weaknesses)			Capabilities - Information (Strength of & national)	Capabilities - Information (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)
<b>O</b> Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (units of the police, military are present)					Organizations - Infrastructure (ment, tion es)
<b>P</b> People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders coalition insurgent)					Organizations - Infrastructure (structure, or, ment)
<b>E</b> Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Information (Information Ops campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)	

Figure 5-3: Structures – Political



**5003. Cultural Factors.** As described on page Green-10, operational culture consists of five (5) “dimensions” influencing operationally relevant behavior, conduct, and attitudes. The example below, Figure 5-4, illustrates a simple operational culture matrix used to capture salient (influential) points as they pertain to the five cultural dimensions and MAGTF operations.

Physical Environment	Economy	Social Structure	Political Structure	Belief Systems
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beach (seasonal gathering place)</li> <li>• Hot-dry summers</li> <li>• Cold wet winters (near coast)</li> <li>• Most housing is permanent / modern</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Robust and resilient service-based economy</li> <li>• Small business opportunity</li> <li>• Farming</li> <li>• Mineral exploitation</li> <li>• Economic opportunity for those who want it</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Men and women are considered equals</li> <li>• Progressive social outlook although a significant portion of the population are “traditional” in mindset</li> <li>• Social bonding occurs before, during and after sporting events</li> <li>• Social consumption of great quantities of alcohol very important (sometimes) with harmful consequences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong central government</li> <li>• State and local governments</li> <li>• Representatives elected through proportional representation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everybody deserves a chance (“fair go”)</li> <li>• “Lucky” country blessed with natural resources</li> </ul>
Influential Cultural Factors Affecting Operations				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beach (seasonal gathering place)</li> <li>• Robust and resilient service-based economy</li> <li>• Social consumption of great quantities of alcohol very important (sometimes) with harmful consequences</li> <li>• Strong central government</li> <li>• Everybody deserves a chance (“fair go”)</li> </ul>				

Figure 5-4: Operational Culture Matrix

**5004. Key Influences.** We can take numerous approaches to help determine key influences. A key influence can exist as a person(s), place, or thing, so we cannot afford to focus on any one area. While we tend to look for people as key influences, we cannot overlook cultural considerations or specific events that can manifest themselves as key influences. The Green Cell likely discovered key influences during the production of the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix; however, as a rule of thumb utilizing the matrices (completed examples, Figure 5-2) will help isolate and/or confirm whether

information uncovered in the production of the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix is in fact a key influence.

**5005. Key Influences Matrix.** The Green Cell can use Figure 5-5 to summarize Key Influences and their potential impact on MAGTF operations. The example below represents three (3) key influences – a person, a place, and a thing to help illustrate how tangible and intangible influences can affect MAGTF operations.

Key Influences	Motivations and Goals	Abilities, Capabilities, Means	Potential Impact on Friendly Operations / Objectives
Prime Minister Nigel Lovelace	Maintain Political Legitimacy / Primacy Protect Lives and Property	Muster Resources / Provides Legitimacy	Facilitate MAGTF Relief Efforts Through Official Government Resources
Beach	A Summer Gathering Place (of Civilians)	Population Disrupts Ship-to-Shore Movement Flooding and Tidal Actions Threaten Population	Complicates Relief Effort Moves People Away From Dedicated Emergency Services
Sports Affiliations	Demonstrate Loyalty to and Faith in Sports Teams	Facilitate Gathering of Like-minded Citizens	Enables Efficient Messaging Dissemination

Figure 5-5: Key Influences Matrix

**5006. Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping.** Figures 5-6 and 5-7 below show tools to help make sense of a large pool of stakeholders. The stakeholder matrix (Figure 5-6) and the stakeholder map (Figure 5-7) help determine key influences (people). The stakeholder map helps further refine resources to engage the stakeholders based on their relative power and interest in the civil environment.

Stakeholder	Interest in Civil Environment	Assessment of Potential Impact on Environment / Friendly	Mitigation / Enhancement Measures
Prime Minister Nigel Lovelace	Maintain Political Legitimacy / Primacy Protect Lives and Property	Coordinate / Facilitate MAGTF Relief Efforts	Enhance - Coordination Meetings, Press Briefings, Messaging
Ambassador Tom Foolery	Maintain Positive Perception of U.S. in Bottomlandia	Coordinate / Facilitate MAGTF Relief Efforts	Enhance - Coordination Meetings, Press Briefings, Messaging
Edward "Ned" Kelly	Enhance Reputation / Increase Civil Following Discredit Gov't	Disrupt Official Relief Efforts	Mitigate - Coordination Meetings, Press Briefings, Messaging

Figure 5-6: Stakeholder Matrix




Figure 5-7: Stakeholder Map (Power-Interest Grid)

**5007. Instability and Stability.** Figure 5-8 represents two (2) distinct products – an Instability Factors Matrix (Grievances / Events / Key Influences) and a Stability Factors Matrix (Resiliencies / Events / Key Influences) combined here for ease of display. The Green Cell populates these matrices with stability-related grievances and resiliencies that key influences may acted on.

<p><b>Grievances:</b> What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified?</p>	<p><b>Events:</b> Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability?</p>	<p><b>Key Influences – Means and Motivations:</b> What are the influences, means and motivations that contribute to an increase in instability?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceived “unfairness” in relief distribution</li> <li>• Societal vulnerability to crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Slow governmental response to disaster</li> <li>• Criminal activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edward “Ned” Kelly – access to criminal networks / enterprises</li> </ul>
<p><b>Resiliencies:</b> What processes, relationships or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any resiliencies that have been or are being undermined?</p>	<p><b>Events:</b> What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability?</p>	<p><b>Key Influences – Means and Motivations:</b> What key influences in the society preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are the motives, and what actions are taken?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-educated population with strong nationalist traditions</li> <li>• Strong central government</li> <li>• Robust / resilient economy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sporting events</li> <li>• Bottomlandia Day celebrations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Binding nationalism</li> <li>• Prime Minister</li> </ul>

Figure 5-8: Instability and Stability Factors

**5008. Civil Most Likely and Most Disruptive.** Figure 5-9 provides an example of Green Cell analysis to predict civil most likely and most disruptive reactions. The Commander can use this analysis to decide which civil reaction to model during the COA wargame.




Figure 5-9: Civil Most Likely and Most Disruptive Analysis

**5009. Civil Environment Model.** Figure 5-10 provides an example of a simple civil environment model that Green Cell personnel can use to support the MCPP. Green Cell should include all elements they feel best represent (models) the society they will war game. The example below shows elements of the various products Green Cell developed (derived from Figures 5-1 - 5-9). A technique to maintain focus is to refer to the MAGTF’s mission and/or tasks and include them in the civil environment model. However, this is not always necessary.




Figure 5-10: Example Civil Environment Model

## 5010. Example Green Cell Turn

Effective turn portions are concise, complete, and capture significant actions in evaluating the friendly COA. Because the Green Cell represents multiple and diverse “Key Influences” in the reaction portion of the turn, organization and clear presentation become important to smooth wargaming and conveying understanding of civil environment factors to the OPT. A technique to achieve this is to structure the Green Cell reactions and present them during the turn using this format:

**“Key Influence:”** Identification of the individual, group, place/asset, or intangible factor (key influence / who).

**“Actions:”** Concise description of “what,” “how,” “where,” and “when”

**“Objective:”** Rationale and purpose of the actions

**Example 1 Green Cell Reactions:** Sheikh Abdul (key influence) withholds participation in the Ramtha City Governance Council beginning immediately due to anger at insufficient project funding in their tribal area compared to neighboring tribal area funding (actions). This is done in order to pressure coalition forces into increasing funding in their tribal area (objective).

**Example 2 Green Cell Reactions:** The Ramtha City Merchants association (key influence) agrees to cooperate with the coalition project plan due to potential economic benefits / contract awards to their businesses (actions), and in order to encourage continued coalition funding that will benefit them (objective).

**Example 3 Green Cell Reactions:** The Shia population in the Irbil neighborhood of Ramtha (key influence) will not actively participate

in the coalition project plan in their area (actions) due to intimidation by the Black August radical group (objective).

**Example 4 Green Cell Reactions:** The rising Kunar River (key influence) threatens local villages on the flood plain (action) forcing people to higher ground via the only improved road (objective).

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## Part VI

### Problem Framing

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**6001. Overview.** During Problem Framing, the Red Cell conducts Problem Framing from the enemy's perspective in parallel to friendly Problem Framing. It collects and analyzes information from the G-2/S-2 and attempts to determine how the enemy will employ its forces to satisfy the enemy commander's mission and intent. The Red Cell enhances the OPT's effort to understand the problem and the environment, especially from an adversarial point of view.

**6002. Coordinate with the G-2/S-2.** Coordination between the Red Cell and the G-2/S-2 is critical. The Red Cell bases its analysis of the enemy on the same intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products and intelligence reporting available to the G-2 staff. Given the commonality of reporting available to the G-2 and Red Cell, while the Red Cell's analysis of the enemy may vary slightly from the larger intelligence community, the OPT should carefully consider such divergence. The Red Cell's analysis must depict the enemy based on doctrine, historical precedence, and regional and cultural expertise, and must be within the range of enemy capabilities. While the Red Cell can provide a valuable, independent evaluation of the adversary, analytic positions not based on a realistic assessment of likely adversary actions and responses are of little value to the OPT. Ultimately, the G-2/S-2 and the Red Cell need to present one coherent intelligence picture to the OPT.

#### **6003. Analyze Adversary Strengths and Weaknesses**

The Red Cell reviews and analyzes the enemy situation in conjunction with the G-2/S-2 effort. The Red Cell examines the enemy situation, doctrine and tactics, and weather and terrain and develops mission and intent to conduct enemy COG analysis and develop enemy COAs. The Red Cell determines and/or refines the



G-2/S-2 determined enemy COAs based on their technical and operational expertise. They will also identify Critical Requirements (CR), Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) and the COG. Any differences are immediately shared with the G-2/S-2.

In addition to developing the enemy COG analysis, the Red Cell conducts COG analysis of friendly forces from the enemy perspective. After completing the initial step, the Red Cell carries the analysis further to determine what the enemy will perceive as friendly CV(s). These may differ from the friendly perspective. The results are critical because they indicate where the enemy may place his focus of effort. This analysis will guide the OPT's COA development and force protection actions. The results will also assist the Red Cell once it begins analysis of the enemy COA.

#### **6004. Develop Enemy Planning Tools**

Utilizing the agreed upon enemy COAs, the Red Cell establishes a set of planning tools like those used by the OPT. This does not represent an attempt to “mirror image” the adversary based on the way friendly forces plan or fight. It is simply a way to organize the Red Cell's analysis to support the conduct of the COA war game.

- Red Cell produced Enemy Planning Tools
- Enemy Mission Statement
- Enemy Commanders Intent
- COG analysis of friendly forces from enemy perspective
- Enemy tactical control measures
- Enemy assessment of friendly G-2/S-2 assessment of enemy strengths and weaknesses

The Red Cell drafts an enemy mission statement that captures what they assess the enemy's higher headquarters instructed them to do (essential tasks) and the five elements of a mission statement.

The Red Cell also drafts a commander's intent for the enemy. The Red Cell bases this on information available from higher headquarters as well as open source reporting, enemy doctrine, recent operational patterns, and available biographic information about enemy commanders. The Red Cell defines the enemy's goals and objectives as well as how the enemy commander envisions achieving them.

The Red Cell conducts COG analysis of friendly forces. The Red Cell examines the weaknesses and strengths of the friendly forces and confirms potential high value targets (HVT) or those assets and things the enemy considers essential for the friendly forces to carry out its mission. Remember, the Red Cell thinks from the perspective of the adversary. At the MEF level, HVT(s) may not be maneuver or fires targets; instead the enemy may focus on more vulnerable targets associated with command and control nodes, logistics nodes, airfields, port facilities, or lines of communication. Often there is a link between CV(s) and HVT(s). By identifying those MAGTF facilities, installations, or nodes the enemy would most likely target, the Red Cell can help the MAGTF force protection planners.

The Red Cell should attempt to determine enemy current and projected unit boundaries based on the current force disposition and enemy doctrinal templates if the G-2/S-2 cannot provide them. Together with the mission and intent, this should reveal the area of operations and probable geographic objectives for the enemy force.

**6005. Advise the Operational Planning Team.** The Red Cell must operate as an integral part of the OPT during Problem Framing. The G-2/S-2 will assign a representative to the OPT who will provide a conduit to the G-2/S-2 section. The G2/S-2 rep will provide IPB updates related to the situation, collections, and weather. The Red Cell, as a part of the OPT, will provide continuous analysis and refinement of the enemy COAs utilizing their expertise to assess enemy actions in granular detail. The Red Cell must inform the G-

2/S-2 section of its analysis as the G-2/S-2 retains responsibility for analysis of the enemy. At the conclusion of Problem Framing, the Red Cell will present a briefing of its analysis to the OPT.

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## Part VII

# Enemy Course of Action Development

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### 7001. Develop/Refine the Enemy Course of Action

To adequately support the COA war game, the Red Cell must develop adversary COAs in the same detail as the remainder of the OPT develops friendly COAs. It is important to remember that the Red Cell develops enemy courses of action in support of the enemy mission and intent and not in response to friendly COAs. The Red Cell typically characterizes the appropriate adversary COAs as MLCOA and MDCOA. When describing an adversary's MDCOA, the Red Cell should specify whether it appears most dangerous in terms of risk to mission or risk to force. When the MAGTF performs a supporting effort, a MDCOA based on risk to force may prove advantageous in terms of risk to HHQ's mission. Whether developing MDCOA or MLCOA, the Red Cell must take a systems-based approach to adversary COA's. This becomes especially important as it relates to near peer competitors and the sophisticated capabilities they bring to the fight from multiple domains.

As with friendly COAs, adversary COAs must be:

- **Suitable.** The COA must accomplish the purpose and tasks and comply with the commander's guidance.
- **Feasible.** The COA must accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources.
- **Acceptable.** The COA must be proportional and worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved, and position. It must be consistent with the law of war as well as militarily and politically supportable.
- **Distinguishable.** The COA must differ significantly from the other COAs.

- **Complete.** The COA must include all tasks to be accomplished. It must address the entire mission (main and supporting efforts, reserve, and associated risks).

The Red Cell focuses on the enemy’s capabilities and assesses enemy intentions. The following questions will help focus the Red Cell:

- “How can the enemy defeat me?” (enemy capabilities)
- “What threatens me the most?” (friendly COG(s))
- “When will the enemy reach a certain point in the battlespace?” (doctrinal rates of movement)
- “Who among the enemy forces is most capable of hurting me in the near future?” (committed forces and reserves available)
- “How fast and by what means can the enemy reach me?” (avenues of approach)
- “How and when did the enemy get to his present location?” (situational awareness)
- “What has the enemy done recently?” (pattern analysis of current operations)
- “How long can it sustain itself and how are its readiness rates effected over time?” (capabilities and limitations)

The Red Cell must remember to not “mirror image”—they must think like the enemy and not like friendly forces. As it refines the enemy COAs, the Red Cell considers the following:

- Enemy COG and CV
- Enemy movement rates and associated maneuver avenues
- Enemy tactical control measures
- Enemy targeting plan
- Enemy engagement criteria
- Enemy threat to the friendly forces’ rear area
- Enemy intelligence collection and counter-reconnaissance capabilities
- Enemy engineering and CBRN capabilities
- Enemy cyber and information operations capabilities

- Enemy assets that are critical to enemy success (HVTs)
- Enemy assessed friendly CV(s)

A complete adversary COA must include tasks and purposes for the designated main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve. The Red Cell should graphically display adversary COAs on a map with the appropriate symbols and task graphics. The map should also depict the adversary's close, deep, and rear areas, and associated boundaries and control measures. The Red Cell must accompany each COA with a detailed narrative that discusses the main effort, supporting efforts, and the reserve, as well as the adversary's concept for decisive, supporting, and sustaining actions. This narrative description must address the adversary's actions across all domains and warfighting functions. Of note, the graphics and narrative must also highlight the adversary's ability to collect intelligence on friendly forces. The OPT must understand the adversary's ability to sense friendly deception efforts as the adversary's ISR capabilities will prominently figure into the reaction phase of the COA war game. Templating adversary reconnaissance units will facilitate counter-reconnaissance planning.

## **7002. Red Cell Interactions and Planning Tools**

OPT and Red Cell interaction enables planners to improve the friendly COAs. Again, the purpose of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly forces in the COA Wargame; rather, it is to improve the plan. The Red Cell keeps the OPT updated on their detailed analysis of the enemy enabling the OPT to improve friendly COAs. COG and CV analysis of the enemy is critical to enhance friendly planning.

The Red Cell conducts an internal mini-war game of their COAs against OPT-developed friendly COA(s) to ensure complete preparation of the enemy for presentation during the wargaming step. The mini-war game constitutes an informal thought process conducted by the Red Cell that examines the execution of the enemy COA. The standard action, reaction, counteraction gaming sequence works well for this process.

During the mini-war game, the Red Cell develops the enemy synchronization matrix. This matrix will help determine the feasibility and realism of the enemy COAs. The matrix also provides a detailed “script” for the Red Cell during the COA war game with the OPT. Planners can post the matrix on a wall for the OPT and the Red Cell to refer to during the war game. It ensures the reasonable allocation of units and assets to support the enemy COAs within the given time and space. Most importantly, it captures in a written form the details of the enemy COA for reference during the COA war game. The Red Cell members discuss each warfighting function’s activities during certain events as they fill in the matrix in.

The OPT leader and the Red Cell planner coordinate details and requirements of the synchronization matrix prior to the COA Wargame to ensure the war game proceeds smoothly. If the COAs are segmented into phases or stages, both the OPT and the Red Cell design their respective synchronization matrices to correspond accordingly. This coordination facilitates comparing and contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s) versus the enemy COA(s).

TTP: When developing and briefing adversary COAs, it helps to describe the conditions or triggers under which the adversary will likely adopt a specific COA. For example, “The adversary will adopt the MDCOA of reinforcing Landing Force Objective 1 prior to H-Hour on D-Day if the 1<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Infantry Brigade is shaped down to 50% of its indirect fire and armor assets or if the adversary’s ISR determines the Amphibious Force’s landing area.” Identifying these conditions assists the OPT in developing PIRs and identifying named areas of interest (NAI) and decision points (DPs). Planners can use the following formula to craft adversary COA adoption criteria:

- MLCOA if condition A and condition B are met, or if condition C is met
- MDCOA if condition D is met or if condition E and condition F are met

### **7003. Advise the Operational Planning Team**

The close communication between the OPT and the Red Cell must continue throughout COA development. The OPT will increasingly rely upon the Red Cell for information about the enemy COA as it develops the friendly COA. The Red Cell must remain prepared to respond to OPT questions with additional details and analysis. Additionally, at the conclusion of COA development, the Red Cell coordinates its analysis with the G-2/S-2 before briefing the OPT on the elements discussed above.

For more detailed guidance on the process for developing complete COAs, MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process* and MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Leader's Guide*.



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## Part VIII

# Course of Action War Game

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### 8001. Introduction

*“No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.”*

- MCDP 1 (1997 - p. 14)

The Red Cell presents doctrine-based enemy reactions to friendly actions during the COA Wargame.

**COA Wargaming:** The COA war game examines and refines the option(s) in light of adversary capabilities and potential actions/reactions as well as the characteristics peculiar to the operating environment, such as weather, terrain, culture, and non-Department of Defense entities or stakeholders. (MCWP 5-10)

### 8002. Preliminary Actions

This step in the MCPP pits friendly COA(s) against enemy COA(s) in a war game. The OPT Lead Planner controls and facilitates the war game with the Red Cell role-playing the enemy. The OPT Lead Planner establishes the rules of engagement and appoints the war game facilitator to control the functioning of the war game. The commander issues guidance on the conduct of the war game that may include:

- Friendly COAs
- Enemy COAs
- The timeline for the phase or stage of the operation

- Critical events
- Level of detail of the war game

### a. Select War Game Technique

The OPT will choose a wargaming technique based on the commander's wargaming guidance (provided simultaneously to the OPT and the Red Cell) suited to the particular situation or type of command. The basic types include:

- **Sequence of Essential Tasks.** The sequence of essential tasks highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle area. This technique enables planners to adapt if the Red Cell commander executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of essential tasks. Using this technique allows wargamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to execute the concept of operations.
- **Avenue in Depth.** Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This technique supports offensive COA(s) or defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.
- **Belts.** Belts divide the terrain into areas or sections that span the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense), or area of operation. This technique appears most effective when the terrain divides into well-defined cross-compartments during phased operations (e.g., a river crossing or helicopter-borne assault), or when the enemy deploys in clearly defined echelons. This technique focuses on the sequential analysis of events in each belt; that is, events expected to occur more or less simultaneously. This type of analysis works well because it focuses on essentially all forces affecting particular events in one timeframe.

- **Box.** The box technique considers a detailed analysis of a critical area, (e.g., colored landing beach, infiltration route, raid objective). It appears most useful in time limited situations, and it applies to all types of units. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area. Planners assume friendly units not engaged in the action can handle the situations in their area of the battlespace and the essential tasks assigned to them.

## **b. Pre-Start Presentations**

Prior to execution of the first moves and countermoves, the Red Cell briefs the OPT on the results of its analysis of the enemy COA. Even though the OPT previously received virtually all of this information, formally presenting the synopsis once again ensures a common understanding of the initial enemy force posture, mission, intent, and a brief description of the enemy COA. Neither the OPT nor the Red Cell should keep “secrets” from each other to gain an advantage during the COA war game. The goal here concerns not so much winning as refining the plan. Commanders and staff should reveal any updated guidance or any new intelligence or other information that might significantly impact OPT planning as early as possible. The OPT leader should determine what information merits consideration during the war game.

The Red Cell can use the event template (MCWP 5-10) to graphically depict enemy COA(s). The Red Cell develops the template using the functional MOS skills of its members. For example, the engineer representative in the Red Cell would ensure the event template includes likely enemy minefield and obstacle locations while the artillery representative would indicate potential enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing sites.

The Red Cell describes those actions the enemy would take prior to the commencement of operations. These actions could include such issues as establishment of logistics sites, reconnaissance screen, assembly areas, and obstacle belts. Planners should also consider adversary operations in the information environment. Finally, the OPT or Red Cell leader can reproduce the enemy synchronization matrix as a handout and disseminate to the OPT and the Red Cell members for the war game. It can serve as a readily available source on the enemy's capabilities and thought process.

### **8003. Conduct of the War Game**

The Red Cell should accurately portray the enemy during the war game while the friendly commander executes his various COA(s). The goal is to produce a concept of operations that will allow the friendly commander to accomplish the mission, not for the Red Cell to win.

The Red Cell should ensure realistic, operationally sound enemy actions indicative of the enemy's perceived thought process. It should address all functional areas and highlight enemy capabilities and limitations. If the OPT encounters any issues or disputes during the war game, the facilitator should intervene, make a decision, note the issue, and continue the process.

#### **a. Relative Combat Power Analysis**

To better understand the interaction between friendly and adversary forces during wargaming, the Red Cell and the OPT leader should conduct a Relative Combat Power Analysis (RCPA) that blends a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the relative combat power of two forces and estimates the outcome of engagements between them.

Whenever possible, a blended approach that leverages the data driven aspects of quantitative analysis and the more granular aspects of a qualitative approach will yield the best results.

Upon completing a quantitative assessment of tangible combat power, planners must draw qualitative conclusions to provide the “so what” for commanders and recommend TTPs to mitigate any relative combat power imbalance for consideration during the development of COAs and wargaming.

Completing step 3 of IPB, Evaluate the Adversary, will yield the necessary detail to conduct a detailed quantitative and qualitative assessment of the adversary’s equipment and overall combat power. The intelligence planner works with the IOC/CIC to ensure the OPT receives a detailed evaluation of the adversary to facilitate its RCPA.

The OPT will further refine its RCPA during the COA war game step of MCPP. As the OPT wargames specific friendly and adversary COAs against each other, it must adjust the RCPA to reflect the impacts of actions across multiple domains.

RCPA tools usually focus on the land domain. The OPT must leverage expertise across multiple domains and warfighting functions to adjust combat power to accurately reflect and correlate adversary and friendly capability and forces. The OPT must agree to these qualitative adjustments to the force correlation process and uniformly and consistently apply them during the wargame. Shaping operations present another issue the OPT must address during the wargame. Shaping will likely change the quantities and dispositions of friendly and adversary forces across the battlespace. This will require an adjustment of the RCPA for each turn of the war game.

Appendix B of The Intelligence Planner’s Guide explores RCPA and Correlation of Forces in more depth and provides a copy of the excel based TRADOC Correlation of Forces tool.

## **b. Game Move Sequence**

A game turn covers all friendly and enemy actions planned to occur during a specified time interval focused on a specific task or event.

Each game turn usually consists of at least three moves—two by the friendly force, one by the enemy force. If the OPT established a Green Cell, it may also require a move. The friendly force makes two moves because the activity should validate and refine the friendly forces' COA, not the enemy's. If necessary, the war game may require additional moves to properly evaluate the friendly COA. If the war game employs a Green Cell, the facilitator will determine whether its move occurs before or after the adversary reaction. In either case, the Red Cell must account for the adversary's actions towards and interactions with the civil population.

- **Friendly Actions.** After providing the various pre-war game friendly and enemy briefs, the war game begins with the first friendly action. The war game then proceeds through each warfighting function representative to detail the friendly COA. Representatives explain how they would execute actions in accordance with the COA and the expected enemy force disposition.
- **Enemy Reactions.** Normally, the Red Cell planner will speak for the Red Cell and respond to friendly actions using the warfighting function methodology. The Red Cell will use an enemy synchronization matrix and event template to describe the enemy's activities in time and space; these are updated as the enemy assessment evolves as a result of the war game. The Red Cell planner will describe enemy actions by domain and/or warfighting function and should present the enemy's concept of operations to include reconnaissance and surveillance. The Red Cell will brief each enemy move in detail to expose any potential collection and targeting opportunities, vulnerabilities, incorrect assumptions, and or deficiencies in the friendly COA.

Considerations:

- The Red Cell planner should describe how the enemy will organize its battlespace.
  - Will the enemy organize with a rear area, main battle area, and security area, or will the enemy organize utilizing a different battlespace concept?
  - Are there potential engagement areas, fire sacks, obstacles...?
  - What is the location, composition, and expected strength of the enemy reserve as well as the anticipated decision point (DP) and criteria the enemy commander might use in committing his reserve?
- The Red Cell planner should brief assessed enemy collection plans.
  - What intelligence collection assets does the enemy employ and how and when will he employ them?
- The Red Cell Planner should brief other enemy DPs
  - The friendly commander will want to know what decisions the enemy commander must make and when he will make those decisions (“Are they event driven?”). What are the likely times, conditions, and areas for the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly NBC defense requirements?
    - When will the enemy begin a withdrawal?
    - Where and when will the enemy use unconventional forces? (See ATP 201.3/MCRP 2-10B.1 *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, for Sector specific considerations pertaining to enemy operations).
- When war gaming a deception plan, the Red Cell should outline target biases and predispositions, how and when the enemy would perceive the desired misleading indicators, and enemy actions that will indicate the successful deception.

The Red Cell planner might also offer insight on the likely effectiveness of friendly actions. For example, the initial enemy MDCOA failed to account for the projected friendly force lay down of the war gamed friendly COA. This may permit the enemy to adopt a different COA that could become the MDCOA in this particular context.

When war gaming a deception plan, the Red Cell should outline target biases and predispositions, how and when the enemy would perceive the desired misleading indicators, and enemy actions that will indicate the successful deception.

The enemy event template and synchronization matrix will be used by the Intelligence Planner to enhance the collection plan. These products will drive where and when to collect information that will confirm or deny the adoption of a specific COA by the enemy.

- **Counteractions.** After the enemy executes its reaction, friendly forces will provide a counteraction. The OPT will discuss the various warfighting functions' activities and record all actions before advancing to the next series of events. If necessary, the war game facilitator authorizes more "moves" by both (or all three if employing a Green Cell) sides in order to achieve the desired fidelity. If possible, the staff analyzes each critical event by identifying the tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down using assets two echelons down.

#### **8004. Recording the War Game**

The recorder annotates and records the map picture at selected points to provide a time-referenced graphic for each COA to support later comparison and decision. Also, recording the war game results provides the staff a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activity, develop decision support templates (DST),



confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and analyze COA(s) based on identified strengths and weaknesses. The Red Cell ensures the maps accurately reflect the enemy disposition at the designated times.

The OPT uses populated overlays (electronic or acetate) and any available automated tools e.g. Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) to aid in the conduct of the war game and to record results. This becomes especially important as the OPT reproduces and disseminates war game results.

The OPT retains the “start” and the “finish” overlays for each war game. The OPT uses the overlays to graphically show the commander the thought process of the war game. The OPT also hands off the overlays to staff officers who will develop the order, thus making the overlays useful transition tools. The retention of these war game overlays also helps to add detail to the branches and sequels of the war game.

### **8005. Data Collection**

The OPT concentrates on collecting data to support the commander’s evaluation criteria. The commander articulates his criteria after COA development prior to the war game. Examples of areas the commander’s criteria may include: the principles of war, assumptions, shortfalls, speed and tempo, and asymmetrical application of combat power. The criteria also identify strengths and weaknesses of each COA and point out necessary corrections. As the sequence of events continues, the OPT identifies branches and sequels that require closer scrutiny. The OPT can accomplish these actions with a side bar or as an ongoing part of the OPT war game. Record each adjustment, branch, and sequel with the initiating time/event. The OPT can eventually add these items to the DST as DPs.

When events occur that cause a deadlock or create unacceptable circumstances, the commander/OPT leader decides whether to abandon that COA or revisit previous actions to modify his counteraction to the enemy. During the action-reaction-counteraction process, the friendly force intelligence representative points out to the OPT the location and the activities of enemy HVT(s). Remember, HVT(s) represent those targets or capabilities the enemy needs to accomplish its mission.

The Red Cell identifies points during the war game where specific HVT assets appear are important to the enemy COA. This prompts the OPT to consider nominations of certain enemy HVT(s) as High Payoff Targets (HPT) making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA under consideration.

As a result of this process, the OPT updates the situation and event templates associated with the enemy COA to reflect NAI(s) and target areas of interest (TAI) supporting the acquisition and engagement of those HPT(s).

The synchronization matrix and DST are particularly valuable tools. The OPT should capture targeting information - including collection requirements, desired firing systems, target movement rates, and engagement times and locations in the synchronization matrix. As a result of the war game's action, reaction, and counteraction process, the OPT identifies targets, branches, or sequels that will require a decision. Each time the OPT identifies such a DP, the recorder makes appropriate entries in the DST and synchronization matrix.

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## **Part IX**

### **Post-War Game Role**

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The Red Cell records its findings for the OPT and continues to assist future operations as required.

#### **9001. Post-War Game Products**

The OPT recorder captures significant decisions made during the war game and the strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s). The recorder captures and records vulnerabilities and weaknesses in friendly forces or friendly COA(s) identified by the Red Cell and includes this information in the friendly synchronization matrix, the war game worksheet, or records it separately. Regardless of where or how recorded, the OPT presents it as part of the COA war game back brief to the commander. The OPT leader also makes the friendly and enemy synchronization matrix and the war game worksheet available for commander's review.

Other useful products are produced from the war game in addition to war gamed friendly COA(s). The OPT entered the war game with a “rough” event template and completed the war game with a “refined,” more accurate event template. The event template, with its NAI(s) and time phase lines, helps the G-2/S-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. The intelligence representative in the OPT uses an event matrix as a “script” during the war game. It also indicates if the commander is relying too much on one or two collection platforms and has overextended these assets.

The draft DST and decision support matrix (DSM) also come out of the COA war game. The commander identifies critical events and potential DP(s) early in the planning process, perhaps as he articulates his commander’s orientation. Normally, the draft DST includes DP(s) and TAI(s) as developed in the war game. The DST

and DSM may change as more information about friendly and enemy forces becomes available.

The Red Cell briefs the enemy COA(s) and describes the data produced during the war game brief to the commander. Besides enemy reference materials, the Red Cell briefs the enemy mission statement, commander's intent, relative strengths and weaknesses analysis, COG/CV analysis, initial synchronization matrix, order of battle, and IPB products.

After a detailed analysis of the friendly COA(s), the commander can now compare those friendly COA(s) against each other and decide which he prefers. The commander identifies the COA with the highest probability of success against the enemy's ML/MDCOA (as based on the commander's evaluation criteria). The command uses this COA to prepare the concept of operations that in turn forms the basis for orders development.

**9002. Future Operations.** If the commander anticipates further operations in the same theater of operations and the OPT continues to plan for future operations, the Red Cell may remain intact. This ensures continuity and reduces the time lost re-orienting a replacement team of analysts for the new Red Cell. As the OPT continues to plan future operations, the Red Cell continues to analyze enemy future operations and provide the required support. The G-2/S-2 continues to provide intelligence analysis and products and guides the Red Cell for as long as the Red Cell remains in existence.

**9003. Disestablishment.** Once orders development begins with no future operations anticipated, the role of the Red Cell normally terminates. The Red Cell should transfer all products to the OPT or to the G-2/S-2, or they can destroy in accordance with standard handling procedures. Support equipment conveys back to the appropriate control authority, and the Red Cell members return to their original organizations and resume their normal duties.

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# Appendix A

## Glossary

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Note: Acronyms and definitions change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
2. MCRP 1-10.2 *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

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### Section I Acronyms

<b>AAA</b>	.....	antiaircraft artillery
<b>AO</b>	.....	area of operations
<b>ASCOPE</b>	.....	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
<b>C2PC</b>	.....	command and control personal computer
<b>CA</b>	.....	civil affairs
<b>CAG</b>	.....	civil affairs group
<b>CAO</b>	.....	civil affairs operations
<b>CCIR</b>	.....	commander's critical information requirement
<b>CAOCL</b>	.....	Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning
<b>CBRN</b>	.....	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
<b>CMO</b>	.....	civil-military operations
<b>COA</b>	.....	course of action
<b>COG</b>	.....	center of gravity
<b>COIN</b>	.....	counterinsurgency
<b>CPB</b>	.....	civil preparation of the battlespace
<b>CR</b>	.....	critical requirement
<b>CULAD</b>	.....	cultural advisor

**CV**..... critical vulnerability  
**DOD**..... Department of Defense  
**DP**..... decision point  
**DSM**..... decision support matrix  
**DST**..... decision support template  
**FAO**..... foreign area officer  
**GIRH**..... generic intelligence requirement handbook  
**HN**..... host nation  
**HPT**..... high-payoff target  
**HUMINT**..... human intelligence  
**HVT**..... high-value target  
**IO**..... information operations  
**IPB**..... intelligence preparation of the battlespace  
**LOO**..... line of operation  
**LREC**..... language, regional expertise, and culture  
**MAGTF**..... Marine Air-Ground Task Force  
**MCIA**..... Marine Corps intelligence activity  
**MCCMOS**..... Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School  
**MCPP**..... Marine Corps Planning Process  
**MDCOA**..... most dangerous course of action  
**MEF**..... Marine Expeditionary Force  
**METT-T**..... mission, enemy, terrain and weather,  
troops, and support available-time available  
**MISO**..... military information support operations  
**MLCOA**..... most likely course of action  
**MOS**..... military occupational specialty  
**NAI**..... named area of interest  
**NBC**..... nuclear, biological, and chemical  
**NGO**..... nongovernmental organization  
**NOG**..... Northern Operational Group  
**OIC**..... officer in charge  
**OPT**..... operational planning team  
**OSINT**..... open-source information  
**PIR**..... priority intelligence requirement  
**PMESII** ... political, military, social, information and infrastructure  
**POLAD**..... political advisor  
**RAO**..... regional affairs officer

**RCPA** .....relative combat power analysis  
**RFI**..... request for information  
**ROC**..... rehearsal of concept  
**SAF**..... stability assessment framework  
**SME**..... subject matter expert  
**SNA**..... social network analysis  
**SOI**..... sources of instability  
**TAI**.....target area of interest  
**TTP**..... tactics, techniques, and procedures  
**USAID** ..... United States Agency of International Development

## Section II Definitions

### A

**amphibious assault** — A type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. See also assault; assault phase. (JP 3-02)

**area of operations** — An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. See also area of responsibility; joint operations area; joint special operations area. (JP 3-0) **center of gravity** — The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See also decisive point. (JP 5-0)

### C

**civil affairs** — Designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

**civil affairs operations** — Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

**civil-military operations** — Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation. (JP 3-57)



**commander's critical information requirement** — An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. Also called CCIR. See also information requirements; intelligence; priority intelligence requirement. (JP 3-0)

**commander's intent** — A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. See also assessment; end state. (JP 3-0)

**concept of operations** — A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Also called CONOPS. (JP 5-0)

**counterinsurgency** — Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN. (JP 3-24) **course of action** — 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. Also called COA. (JP 5-0)

**critical vulnerability** — An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 5-0)

## D

**decision point** — A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. See also course of action; decision support template; target area of interest. (JP 5-0)

**decision support template** — A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming that depicts

decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. Also called DST. See also course of action; decision point. (JP 2-01.3)

## E

**exploitation** — 1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains, and making permanent the temporary effects already created. 2. Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. 3. An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. See also attack. (JP 2-01.3)

## H

**high-payoff target** — A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. Also called HPT. See also high-value target; target. (JP 3-60)

**high-value target** — A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. Also called HVT. See also high-payoff target; target. (JP 3-60) human intelligence

**host nation** — A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

## I

**intelligence preparation of the battlespace** — The analytical methodologies employed by the Services or joint force component commands to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain. Also called IPB. See also joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. (JP 2-01.3)

**information operations** — The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert

with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; military information support operations. (JP 3-13)

## L

**line of operation** — A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 5-0)

## M

**mission statement** — A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. See also mission. (JP 5-0)

## N

**named area of interest** — The geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action. Also called NAI. See also area of interest. (JP 2-01.3)

**nongovernmental organization** — A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

## O

**objective** — 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed. 2. The specific goal of the

action taken which is essential to the commander's plan. See also target. (JP 5-0)

**objective area** — A geographical area, defined by competent authority, within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. Also called OA. (JP 3-06)

**obstacle belt** — A brigade-level command and control measure, normally depicted graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the ground tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle employment and focus the defense. See also obstacle. (JP 3-15)

**open-source intelligence** — Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. Also called OSINT. See also intelligence. (JP 2-0)

**order of battle** — The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OB; OOB. (JP 2-01.3)

## P

**priority intelligence requirement** — An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. Also called PIR. See also information requirements; intelligence; intelligence process; intelligence requirement. (JP 2-01)

**public affairs** — Communication activities with external and internal audiences. Also called PA. See also command information; public information. (JP 3-61)

## R

**raid** — An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. (JP 3-0)

**reconnaissance** — A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)

## T

**tactical control** — The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1)

**target area of interest** — The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Also called TAI. See also area of interest; high-value target; target. (JP 2-01.3)

## W

**withdrawal operation** — A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy. (JP 3-17)

## **Section III References**

### **Joint Publications**

-Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

### **Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP)**

-MCDP 1 Warfighting

### **Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP)**

-MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

-MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (also Army FM 3-24)

-MCWP 5-10 Marine Corps Planning Process

### **Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)**

-MCRP 1-10.2 Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

-MCRP 2-10B.1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield-Battlespace

### **Marine Corps Technical Publication (MCTP)**

-MCTP 3-03A, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations

### **Pamphlets, Circulars and Handbooks**

-MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 Operational Planning Team Leader's Guide

-Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School Circular 3.1  
MAGTF CMO

-Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Pamphlet Cultural Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH) (MCIA August 2008; DOD-GIRH-2634-001-08)

-TRADOC's The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook

### **Published Books/Studies/Articles**

-Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber; Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning [CAOCL] 2008)

-Robert Greene Sands; *Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-first Century Military*, 2014

-General Anthony Zinni; *Capital “W” War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War*, 1998

-Fosher, K., et al. (2017). *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals*. Quantico, VA: Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning